The deep crisis of European diplomacy
On the other hand, Leonhard detects - using the example of Marine Le Pen's election programme - an increasing nationalism in the European states. It is not only in France that movements are establishing themselves that are directed against globalisation and European integration, through which they see their prosperity, their culture and their status threatened. Leonhard concludes: “Europe's internal culture war has undermined its soft power. The EU would like to see itself as a champion of democracy, but many of the world's largest democracies are reluctant to take its side on the Ukraine issue. Europe's conflicting identities have all contributed to this lack of global appeal."[1]
This example already clearly shows that there is a wide gap between aspiration and reality. For a president of a large European member state like France must be measured by his deeds. Macron's vision of a new European identity based on liberal democracy can at best be declared as soft power propaganda. Police-state measures to fight terrorism, discrimination and exclusion at the time of Covid-19, the activation of Article 43.1 to push through his controversial pension reform[2] talk a different language.
Soft power - a trademark of the EU?
In the political literature, the EU is often described as an example of soft power “because, on the one hand, it does not have comparable military means of power and resources as the USA and because, on the other hand, according to its self-image, it acts as a 'civilian power' in the world”. The EU's enlargement and neighbourhood policy would thus be just as much a part of Brussels' soft power as development and international climate policy.[3]
The European Union's ruling elite thus claims to be a prime example of the application of soft power. This attitude is supported by numerous political organisations, interest groups and, last but not least, the mainstream media. Europe’s soft power, created through cultural and media exchange, free movement of people, exchange of goods and gradual harmonisation of laws, should continue to radiate and work for itself.
Here, too, the EU leadership must be measured less by its words than by its deeds. For the strong ties to the NATO defence alliance and the associated assertion of transatlantic interests is not an expression of soft power or a self-image as a civilian power. And the activities of the European Union in the countries of the Global South have less to do with development and climate policy than with concrete economic and geostrategic interests of the EU and its transatlantic partners.
However, blaming an “internal culture war” for the crisis of soft power in the EU misses the point. This is part of a political propaganda aimed at distracting attention from the fact that the EU's ruling elites themselves, through their actions, are taking away the ground from any form of soft power. Let us take diplomacy as a classic example. Here it has become customary that diplomatic meetings are increasingly held in the form of “elite, hand-picked circles” parallel to the international organisations. Whether it is the World Economic Forum or the Munich Security Conference - ideally, like-minded people meet to encourage each other in their actions. All others are ostentatiously excluded. This approach thwarts the essence of diplomacy, i.e. the cultivation of relations between all states by peaceful means. Until recently absolutely unimaginable in diplomatic terms, the Austrian Federal President Alexander van der Bellen did not invite representatives of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Islamic Republic of Iran to the New Year's reception for the diplomatic corps. This is not an example of successful soft power.
If we want to fathom where Europe's crisis in the area of soft power lies, we must dig deeper and grasp the issue - beyond the politics of the day and propaganda - on a meta-level. This is often easier if we use examples from history.
The Wisdom of Zhuge Liang
This is a typical story about the Chinese characteristic of winning over one's opponent through virtue. Zhuge Liang, the prime minister of the state of Shu (221-263), captured Meng Huo, the leader of the tribes in the southern Nanzhong region. In order to stabilise the rule of the state of Shu in the southern regions, Zhuge Liang decided to convince his prisoner to surrender voluntarily. He wanted to win his opponent's heart and thus establish peace on the southern border once and for all. Therefore, Zhuge Liang did not kill or insult Meng Huo. Instead, he allowed his prisoner to observe his troop deployment and asked him for his impressions. The latter replied that he was not impressed and that if he was allowed to go back, he would be able to defeat his captor. Zhuge Liang did indeed release him, Meng Huo was again defeated and captured a second time. This time he also refused to admit defeat and was released again. This was repeated seven times.
When Zhuge Liang was about to release him for a seventh time, Meng Huo no longer felt like fighting the Shu troops. He admired Zhuge Liang's generosity and stratagems and offered him his allegiance. This example shows us that the success of soft power is not about creating elite circles to welcome those who share the same values and goals. It is not about convincing the opponent, it is about winning his heart. Chuko Liang honoured his opponent Meng Huo with a grand banquet, left the conquered lands to his regency and retreated north with his troops. He no longer needed to defend the border to the south because one of his closest allies was sitting there.
The fine art of diplomacy
Let us now compare this finding with the concept of soft power and the interpretation used by European Union leadership elites in this context.
It is the essence and high art of diplomacy to use vague and unclear terms for as long as possible. Within the framework of dialectical processes, diplomacy gains information about the way of thinking and the conceptual understanding of the communication partner. The aim is to avoid having to commit to one's own intentions and goals for as long as possible, thereby gaining greater political room for manoeuvre. This principle is not new. This principle was certainly also taken to heart by strategists like Chuko Liang. This principle has slowly but surely brought him closer to his goal of securing the southern border of the empire.
The elitist approach of the European ruling elites leads them to sharply distinguish themselves from "opponents" who allegedly do not share their values and convictions. This approach unites them with their transatlantic allies. Countries like China or Russia have been accused for some years of using manipulative diplomatic policies to influence and undermine the political system of a target country. This is summarised under the term Sharp Power. The Chinese and Russians are accused of using soft power measures to suppress the free will and self-determination of individuals and societies.[4]
Struggle for doctrinal supremacy
The concept of American re-education is not based on the gradual use of various forms of violence to achieve political goals. The American concept of re-education uses psychological, sociological and material means to manipulate the addressees. This is done until the addressee in question has adopted the goals and values and even believes that this is the result of free will. European elites have adopted this concept. They claim the attribution of the term soft power and want to limit it to countries that share the goals and values of the USA and its friends and allies. These countries are subsumed under the vague term "democracies". According to this ideological assessment, countries that they do not count among their elite circles are equally vaguely labelled "authoritarian", with malign motives being imputed to them. Therefore, their soft power activities must also have a malign motive.
It is not Europe's soft power that is in crisis, it is European diplomacy itself. For only those who pursue their own intentions and goals have the means and possibilities of diplomatic negotiation in their hands. Those who have to enforce the intentions and goals of another have given these means and possibilities out of their hands and must serve as a vicarious agent for the soft power activities of a third party. This is unmistakably the case for the European Union, which has placed itself at the mercy of its transatlantic allies in this respect.
In his latest book, British historian Ian Morris refers to the readjustment of the world map after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. He quotes from an unpublished draft of the 1992 "Defence Planning Guidance"[5]:
"Our first objective is to prevent the rise of any new rival, whether on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that would pose a comparable threat to the Soviet Union. To do this, we must strive to avoid any hostile power dominating a region whose resources, under consolidated control, would be sufficient to exercise global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia."
Morris comments: “Like all such documents, this one was immediately leaked to the media. Its directness provoked an outcry of indignation and the Department of Defence sought to defuse it; but since then all American governments have more or less complied.”[6]
Therefore, it is not Europe's internal culture war that is undermining soft power. The soft power activities of the European ruling elites on behalf of their allies are the trigger for the culture war in the European Union. If the member states do not quickly take the reins of action back into their own hands, they will have to make the greatest sacrifice for the global hegemonic interests of the USA as its vassal state.
This article was first published in "Soft Power: National Dimension", #4 of the Public Diplomacy Journal under the brand of Meeting Russia.[1] https://ecfr.eu/article/europes-soft-power-problem/
[2] The article states that a law introduced by the government with reference to it is deemed to be adopted - unless a motion of no confidence in the government tabled within 24 hours receives a majority.
[3] https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/das-europalexikon/177268/soft-power/
[4] here especially the two articles in Foreign Policy: Christopher Walker, Jessica Ludwig: The Meaning of Sharp Power. How Authoritarian States Project Influence, November 16, 2017; Christopher Walker, Shanthi Kalathil, Jessica Ludwig: Forget Hearts and Minds. Soft power is out; sharp power is in. Here's how to win the new influence wars, September 14, 2018.
[5] https://militarist-monitor.org/profile/1992_draft_defense_planning_guidance/
[6] "Geography is Destiny: Britain's Place in the World" (Profile Books London, 2002), Chapter 11, free translation from German